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Abstract
Praxis for Peace reviews legal scholarship in the fields of peace
negotiation, constitutional reform and international criminal
accountability, and explores how legal scholars have created applicable
theories in these fields which peace practitioners apply in a variety of
*
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contexts. These applications create new case studies which provide the
basis for evolution and refinement of the legal theories. The Article
further provides examples of how scholars associated with the Public
International Law & Policy Group have significantly contributed to the
Praxis for Peace.

I.

Introduction

I was honored to participate in Case Western Reserve University
(“CWRU”) School of Law’s symposium on “The Academy and
International Law: A Catalyst for Change and Innovation” in
recognition of the Cox International Law Center’s 30th Anniversary
and the 25th Anniversary of the founding of the Public International
Law and Policy Group (“PILPG”). As a member of the panel on the
“Academy and the Pursuit of Peace and Human Rights,” I presented
my reflections on Praxis for Peace—the contributions that legal
scholars have made to the pursuit of peace and human rights through
the development of applied theories on peace negotiation, constitutional
reform and accountability for human rights abuses. These theories have
formed the bedrock for significant praxis (theoretical application) by
organizations such as PILPG, whose work has helped to evolve the
theoretical frameworks. PILPG is a global nonprofit law firm founded
by American University Professor Paul Williams and CWRU Law
School Dean Michael Scharf twenty-five years ago.1 As legal scholars
and former attorneys in the U.S. State Department Office of Legal
Adviser, they both understood from experience the important ways that
legal scholarship and practice in the public international law field are
mutually reinforcing, and they created an organization that contributed
significantly to this dynamic relationship. As a legal scholar and former
State Department attorney who serves in a senior position with PILPG,
I appreciate the dynamism of Praxis for Peace. I have regularly drawn
from the work of legal scholars in my work at the State Department
and within PILPG. As a legal scholar, I have sought to evolve the
Praxis for Peace with my own scholarly contributions. This Article
explores key legal theories that contribute to Praxis for Peace in the
areas of constitutional reform, peace negotiation, and human rights
accountability. I conclude the piece with an overview of some key
contributions that practitioners with PILPG have made to Praxis for
Peace.

1.

See PUB. INT’L L. & POL’Y GRP., https://www.publicinternationallawand
policygroup.org [https://perma.cc/99GE-7DVE].
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II. Constitutional Reform: Process and Design
In the area of constitutional reform, legal scholars have made
important observations about constitutional reform processes and
constitutional design approaches that have greatly influenced Praxis
for Peace in the transitional justice space. In the area of constitutionmaking, these applicable theories have focused on the importance of the
inclusive participatory process referred to as participatory constitutionmaking. I have added my own theoretical framework about the dangers
of pursuing constitution-making during active conflict called conflict
constitution-making. The theoretical frameworks for participatory
constitution-making and conflict constitution-making are explored
herein.
A. Participatory Constitution-Making

Since the late twentieth century, constitution-making after conflict
has trended towards greater transparency, citizen engagement, and
inclusivity.2 Scholars have advocated for participatory constitutionmaking in post-conflict and transitioning States in order to help resolve
long-standing disputes by fostering consensus among a diverse array of
groups on national principles and by addressing the concerns of
previously marginalized citizens.3 Participatory constitution-making
describes a set of transparent and inclusive drafting processes that have
been utilized in post-conflict and transitioning States to ensure broad
societal acceptance of a new regime or constitutional order, particularly
those following a political revolution or the resolution of a civil conflict.4
As a hallmark of legitimacy for modern constitutions, participatory
constitution-making emphasizes citizen involvement and participation
in the drafting of constitutions.5 Participatory processes have frequently
2.

For example, transition leaders in an array of countries, including Kenya,
Uganda, Brazil, Thailand, Papua New Guinea, and South Africa have
utilized participatory constitution-making processes. JASON GLUCK &
MICHELE BRANDT, PARTICIPATORY AND INCLUSIVE CONSTITUTION MAKING:
GIVING VOICE TO THE DEMANDS OF CITIZENS IN THE WAKE OF THE ARAB
SPRING 5–6 (2015).

3.

Id.; Angela M. Banks, Expanding Participation in Constitution Making:
Challenges and Opportunities, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1043, 1046–48
(2008); Vivien Hart, Constitution-Making and the Transformation of
Conflict, 26 PEACE & CHANGE 153, 154 (2001); GLUCK & BRANDT, supra
note 2.

4.

See Hart, supra note 3 (describing the importance of constitutions and
the process of constitution-making to completing the establishment of a
new polity).

5.

Banks, supra note 3 at 1046; Alicia L. Bannon, Note, Designing a
Constitution-Drafting Process: Lessons from Kenya, 116 YALE L.J. 1824,
1826–27 (2007). See generally Kevin L. Cope, The Intermestic Constitution:
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been post-conflict tools that have followed or been concomitant with
the resolution of a political revolution or violent civil conflict. Best
practice suggests that a cessation of hostilities and political settlement
should be agreed to prior to the initiation of an effective participatory
constitution-making process.6
For example, participatory constitution-making was successfully
utilized in Tunisia following the Arab Spring and in South Africa
following decades-long civil strife between minority groups and the
apartheid government.7 Transition leaders in countries such as Kenya,
South Africa, Thailand, Papua New Guinea, Uganda, and Brazil have
also pursued participatory constitution-making processes for many
purposes, including to foster consensus on fundamental national
principles, incorporate the aspirations of previously marginalized
citizens, broaden the constitution makers’ understanding of citizens’
challenges, break from an autocratic past by laying a foundation for
democratic practices, and make the constitution and future
governments more legitimate in the eyes of citizens and the world.8
These participatory constitution-making processes were largely viewed
as legitimate by their citizenry and international experts because they
were deliberative and transparent, occurred in phases, and provided
opportunity for public feedback, participation, and acceptance (either
directly or through elected representatives) among a diverse array of
citizens with divergent racial, religious, and ideological backgrounds.9
The concepts of internal and external participatory systems help to
describe the types of bodies and processes used in post-conflict
participatory constitution-making.10 Internal systems enable citizens to
Lessons from the World’s Newest Nation, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 667 (2013)
(discussing the influence of transnational and domestic forces on
constitutional rights and structural provisions).
6.

Kirsti Samuels, Post-Conflict Peace-Building and Constitution-Making, 6
CHI. J. INT’L L. 663, 664 (2006) (“Constitution-making after conflict is an
opportunity to create a common vision of the future of a state and a road
map on how to get there. The constitution can be partly a peace
agreement and partly a framework setting up the rules by which the new
democracy will operate.”).

7.

See generally Darin E.W. Johnson, Beyond Constituent Assemblies and
Referenda: Assessing the Legitimacy of the Arab Spring Constitutions in
Egypt and Tunisia, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1007 (2015) (discussing the
constitution-making processes in conflicted regions); Ziyad Motala,
Constitution-Making in Divided Societies and Legitimacy: Lessons from
the South African Experience, 15 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 147 (2005)
(using South Africa as an example of successful participatory constitutionmaking).

8.

GLUCK & BRANDT, supra note 2, at 5–6.

9.

See Samuels, supra note 6, at 664.

10.

Angela M. Banks, Challenging Political Boundaries in Post-Conflict States,
29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 105, 108 (2007).
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participate directly or through representatives in the drafting process.11
External systems exist where the government appoints a drafting
body’s members and citizens are excluded from the drafting body but
may participate through public meetings and written submissions.12
B. Conflict Constitution-Making

Building on this scholarly framework, in my work at the U.S. State
Department during the Arab Spring, I observed the phenomenon of
conflict constitution-making and developed this into a theoretical
framework in my scholarship.
Many of the goals of participatory constitution-making processes
are frustrated when constitution-making occurs during active conflict.
Participatory constitution-making encourages deliberative negotiation
and public participation in State creation and institutional design, but
constitution-makers are unable to pursue these goals when the security
environment does not permit widespread public engagement. Further,
politically aligned armed actors can use violent civil conflict to
manipulate constitution-making processes. Conflict constitutionmaking occurs when warring belligerents that seek to achieve political
objectives through armed force co-opt ongoing constitution-making
processes to achieve their political ends under the threat of force. These
armed actors effectively transform the constitution-making process into
another site of battle. The markers of a conflict constitution-making
process include (1) extreme conflict amongst constitutional drafters
that mirrors the positions of warring belligerents; (2) an inability of
drafters to reach consensus on these political issues; and (3) boycott
and rejection of non-consensual constituent assembly choices by major
blocs. The incorporation of these conflicts into constitutional texts risks
the creation of conflict constitutions with embedded conflicts, rather
than embedded consensus solutions. By adopting constitutional
provisions that are highly divisive, conflict constitution-making can
exacerbate and prolong rather than reduce societal divisions.
For example, the initial constitution-making processes undertaken
in Iraq and Afghanistan during the U.S.-led military interventions and
occupations, and in the creation of South Sudan, had limited scopes
due to ongoing violent conflict and could hardly be articulated as
broadly participatory. Nevertheless, these constitution-making
processes were initiated with the goal of moving the respective
countries’ political transitions forward. Despite ongoing civil conflict in
each country, the constitution-making processes arguably advanced the
political transition and consolidated authority within the new successor
government in each country. In the extreme circumstance of ongoing
violent civil war with competing governments, such as in Libya and
11.

Id. at 109.

12.

Id. at 108–09.
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Yemen, the pursuit of constitution-making not only frustrates
consensus-building with diverse constituencies, it fosters further
conflict.13
In Libya and Yemen, the political transitions heralded by the Arab
Spring devolved into civil wars that are ongoing at the time of writing
this piece.14 As the political transitions in Libya and Yemen devolved
into civil war, the constitution-making processes also devolved into
conflict over the same outcomes that armed elites sought on the
battlefield by force.15 As a consequence of these devastating civil wars,
constitutional reform processes that were intended to cement political
transitions from authoritarianism to democracy were instead held
hostage by the armed perpetrators of the protracted civil conflicts. The
violent intensity of the civil conflicts in Yemen and Libya undermined
the conciliatory objectives of participatory constitution-making in both
countries. The undermining of conciliatory processes, in turn, imperiled
the creation of consensus constitutional texts and risked the creation of
“conflict constitutions” that would prolong, rather than remedy, the
sources of conflict. During civil war, unless a political detente can be
reached that commits armed actors to a consensual and participatory
constitution-making process, armed power brokers exploit the process
and drive constitution-makers away from accommodation and into
conflict. Such a conflict constitution-making process produces a
“conflict constitution” that enshrines rather than ameliorates the
sources of conflict.
The transition governments in Libya and Yemen each initiated a
constitution-making process before the countries devolved into civil
war. The declining security environment in each country prevented
broad-based, inclusive participatory constitution-making. Warring
political blocs began to press for their political aims within constitutionmaking bodies. The constitution-making processes themselves were
inappropriate fora for much needed peacemaking as they did not allow
for timely political negotiation and bargaining among key
13.

Darin E.W. Johnson, Conflict Constitution-Making in Libya and Yemen,
39 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 293, 297 (2017).

14.

See Jacob Mundy, A Decade Later, No End in Sight for Libya’s Political
Transition, THE CONVERSATION (Jan. 25, 2022), https://theconversation
.com/a-decade-later-no-end-in-sight-for-libyas-political-transition-175531
[https://perma.cc/AK7J-YL6P]; Johnson, supra note 13. The “civil wars”
in Libya and Yemen began after the NATO intervention supporting the
Libyan opposition’s ouster of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, and after the
U.N. and U.S.-brokered departure of President Hadi in Yemen. Although
civil conflict occurred immediately following the Arab Spring uprisings in
both countries, the “civil wars” discussed in this piece began in 2014 when
dual governments in each country arose, violently clashing with one
another and claiming authority in the wake of the initial Arab Spring
political transitions.

15.

Johnson, supra note 13, at 297.
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stakeholders.16 Internationally-backed, external peace negotiations
became necessary to open space for meaningful constitutional reform.

III. Constitutional Design
In multiethnic sectarian societies, intergroup conflicts (hereinafter
“interethnic conflicts”) are frequently a source of civil discord.
Transitioning States have sought to address the problem of interethnic
conflicts in various ways. Some States achieve this end by
accommodating ethnic cleavages explicitly within constitutional
structures.17 States also employ various forms of federalism and
decentralization to diffuse interethnic conflicts, which are frequently
regional in nature.18
Scholars have generally referred to two constitutional design
approaches for addressing interethnic conflicts in highly divided
societies: consociationalism and centripetalism.19 Both design features
are both incorporated into constitutions and electoral laws to secure
multiethnic support for a state’s democratic institutions of
governance.20 Consociationalism accommodates various ethnic groups
by guaranteeing group representation in governing bodies.21
Centripetalism moderates ethnic group views through the election of
moderate officials that represent multiethnic constituencies.22
A. Consociationalism—Ethnic Accommodation

Under consociational democracy, ethnic groups are granted a
significant amount of autonomy over their affairs, a veto or partial veto
over the central government’s decisions, and proportional
representation in government institutions.23 Consociationalism is
designed to protect ethnic groups from harm by other ethnic groups or
16.

Jason Gluck, Constitution-Building in a Political Vacuum: Libya and Yemen
in 2014, in ANNUAL REVIEW OF CONSTITUTION-BUILDING PROCESSES: 2014,
at 43, 44 (Melanie Allen et al. eds., 2015).

17.

Johnson, supra note 13, at 329–30.

18.

Id. at 330.

19.

See Donald L. Horowitz, Conciliatory Institutions and Constitutional
Processes in Post-Conflict States, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1213, 1216–17
(2008) (explaining the difference between the consociationalism design,
which is centered on a “regime of guarantees,” and the centripetalism
design, which focuses on electoral incentives).

20.

Johnson, supra note 13, at 330.

21.

Id.

22.

Id.

23.

See Karol Edward Soltan, Constitution-Making at the Edges of Constitutional
Processes in Post-Conflict States, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1409, 1424 (2008)
(elaborating on the defining characteristics of a constitutional democracy).
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by the central government.24 Because consociationalism seeks to protect
competing groups, one scholar has described consociationalism as “a
peace treaty extended into the workings of government.”25
Consociationalists recognize and accommodate ethnic group identity
and give them status qua ethnic groups within democratic institutions.26
Consociationalists advocate for multiethnic governing coalitions,
favoring systems in which parliamentary, executive, and administrative
positions are allocated on a proportional group basis through
proportional parliamentary electoral systems, multiethnic cabinets
operate by consensus, and proportional hiring is used in the civil service
and the military.27 Consociationalists guarantee multiethnic outcomes
through multiethnic seats in bodies. Under consociational models, a
majoritarian democracy accommodates ethnic diversity through the
explicit guarantee of ethnic representation in political bodies.28
However, some have critiqued consociationalism by saying that it
accommodates ethnic extremists because group representatives
represent “their” ethnic group exclusively.29
B. Centripetalism—Ethnic Moderation

Centripetal democracies are designed to reward moderate behavior
at the expense of extremists. Centripetal design features incorporated
into constitutions and electoral laws incentivize moderate politicians
within ethnic groups to compromise with moderate politicians in other
ethnic groups.30 Centripetal democracies contain mechanisms to elevate
moderate ethnic representatives and parties, such as multiethnic
electoral districts and interethnic coalitions.31 Centripetalists believe
that these approaches support moderation because individual
representatives and coalition members must represent a multiplicity of
views, rather than the views of their ethnic group exclusively.32
24.

Id. at 1424.

25.

Id.

26.

Johnson, supra note 13, at 331.

27.

See Horowitz, supra note 19, at 1216 (emphasizing that the consociationalist
design is rooted in the principle of proportional inclusion and a group
culture).

28.

Johnson, supra note 13, at 331.

29.

See Horowitz, supra note 19, at 1216–17.

30.

See Soltan, supra note 23, at 1424 (explaining that the centripetal approach
focuses on collaboration among moderate politicians at the expense of
excluding extremists).

31.

See Horowitz, supra note 19, at 1217 (explaining that the underlying
mechanism of the centripetal approach consists of politicians compromising
on ethnic issues in order to appeal for voter support from disparate ethnic
groups).

32.

Id. at 1218.
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Centripetalists apply a wide range of tools to support moderates such
as the alternative vote (a system that allows for the interethnic
exchange of second and subsequent voting preferences) or requirements
that candidates receive a plurality of the vote across an ethnically
diverse territorial area in order to secure electoral victory.33 In short,
whereas consociationalism manages multiethnic diversity through
autonomy and ethnic group representation, centripetalism attempts to
manage multiethnic diversity through bolstering moderation across
ethnic groups.

IV. Models for Allocation of State
Power in Divided States
The allocation of state power between the central and local
governments can drive civil conflict, as occurred in Libya and Yemen.34
In light of this, comparative constitutional scholars have suggested
various models of allocating state power through constitutional
provisions to address ethno-regional conflict.35 These models include
ethnic federalism and political decentralization, which focus on the
devolution of state power in a manner intended to reduce ethnic
divisions.
A. Ethnic Federalism

Federalism refers to the sharing of state power between a national
authority and subnational or regional authority.36 Ethnic federalism is
“a term used to describe a particular set of governmental arrangements
specifically designed to ameliorate conflict among or between [ethnic]
subgroups in a sharply divided state.”37 Ethnic federalism is a form of
consociationalism as it reflects the elements of that system: “(1)
executive powersharing among the representatives of all significant
groups; (2) a high degree of internal autonomy for groups that wish to
33.

See id. at 1217–18.

34.

See RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON POST-CONFLICT STATE BUILDING 15 (Paul
R. Williams & Milena Sterio eds., 2020).

35.

Id.

36.

See Alemante G. Selassie, Ethnic Federalism: Its Promise and Pitfalls for
Africa, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 51, 56–58 (2003) (explaining that federalism
contains two essential attributes: (1) dispersion of power among many
centers of authority and (2) existence of constitutional mandates that
legitimize the various centers of authority’s claims of rights against the
central government).

37.

Id. at n.20 (internal citations omitted); see e.g., Hallie Ludsin, Peacemaking
and Constitution-Drafting: A Dysfunctional Marriage, 33 U. PA. J. INT’L L.
239, 290 (describing the insertion of ethnic federalism clauses into Nepal’s
2006 Interim Constitution, which led to the signing of the Comprehensive
Peace Accord later that year).
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have it; (3) proportional representation and proportional allocation of
civil service positions and public funds; and (4) a minority veto on the
most vital issues.”38 As with other forms of consociationalism, some
scholars have questioned whether ethnic federalism exacerbates or
ameliorates ethnic conflict.39 While systems of federalism often differ,
some of the characteristics of a constitutional system premised on
ethnic federalism are discussed below.
1.

Protections for Cultural and Linguistic Identity

The protection of an ethnic group’s distinct cultural and linguistic
identity within a broader national culture frequently underlies an ethnic
group’s desire for political autonomy. For instance, the South African
Constitution recognizes ethnic groups’ rights to their own languages
and cultures and reinforces those rights through a federal form of
government that empowers provinces to protect those rights.40
2.

Ethnicity-Based “Self-Rule”

Some States have permitted subnational “self-rule” on the basis of
ethnic identity to address ethnic groups’ desire for cultural, linguistic,
and political autonomy. For example, the Ethiopian Constitution
provides for a model of ethnic federalism that allows subnational groups
to have self-governing status on the basis of their ethnic identity.41 The
entire Ethiopian State is organized along an ethnic federal form of
government that consists of nine ethnic-based federal states.42 Most
Sub-Saharan African States have avoided Ethiopia’s model of
constitutional recognition of federal self-rule, but ethnic groups have
continued to press for ethnic-based federal self-rule in a number of subSaharan African countries, often because of their historic presence and
concentration in particular regions of a country.43

38.

David Wippman, International Law and Ethnic Conflict on Cyprus, 31
TEX. INT’L L.J. 141, 173 n.220 (1996).

39.

See Selassie, supra note 36, at 86 (asserting that ethnic federalism
exacerbates ethnic distrust and social discord because it deliberately and
openly highlights ethnic differences that might otherwise fade with time).

40.

Id. at 54.

41.

See id. (discussing the inclusive approach to ethnic identity that the
Ethiopian Constitution provides).

42.

See id. at 54–55 (noting that eight of the nine provinces were organized
along ethnic lines to make the province the principle vehicle for aggregating
major ethnic groups’ political, cultural, and linguistic identity). The
Ethiopian model of ethnic federalism goes much further than South Africa’s
model which does not organize provinces primarily along ethnic lines.

43.

See id. at 60 (highlighting the fact that many ethnic groups within African
countries have staged uprisings against the central government to demand
official recognition of their separate social identities).
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3.

Subnational Constitutions

Some, but not all, federal systems permit subnational units to
create their own constitutions. Some subnational constitutional scholars
have argued that merely the authority to create a subnational
constitution, even if it is not exercised, can serve important conflict
reduction goals.44 The transitional constitutions of South Africa and
Iraq both included provisions which allowed regional governments to
develop subnational constitutions as part of the power-sharing
arrangement negotiated among major ethnic groups.45 In some
circumstances, difficult issues that could not be resolved during national
constitution-making processes can be deferred to the regional
constitution-making process.46
4.

Political and Legal Autonomy

Federal systems are designed to provide a degree of autonomy to
regional governments to resolve legal and political and governance
matters left to their competency by the national constitution.47 Though
rare, some federal arrangements, such as the Ethiopian Constitution,
provide an option for a region to secede.48 It is more typical, however,
for negotiators to grant significant autonomy, short of secession, to

44.

See Jonathan L. Marshfield, Authorizing Subnational Constitutions in
Transnational Federal States: South Africa, Democracy, and the KwaZuluNatal Constitution, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 585, 589–90 (2008)
(discussing how, although certain provinces did not create their own
subnational constitutions, gaining the authority to do so was an important
part of the political settlement to mitigate inter-ethnic conflict).

45.

See id. at 622 (describing the strategic provisions in transition constitutions
that help create a smooth transition of power); see also Michael J. Kelly,
The Kurdish Regional Constitutional Within the Framework of the Iraqi
Federal Constitution: A Struggle for Sovereignty, Oil, Ethnic Identity, and
the Prospects for a Reverse Supremacy Clause, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 707
(2010) (discussing the creation and adoption of the Kurdish regional
constitution).

46.

See Kelly, supra note 45, at 746 (discussing that one such issue left
unresolved in the federal constitution was the status of the oil rich city of
Kirkuk in Iraq, wherein both Baghdad and the Region of Kurdistan wanted
to maintain control of Kirkuk and the Iraqi constitution deferred resolution
of the issue to a referendum; ultimately, the regional Kurdish constitution
defined Kirkuk as part of the Kurdish region).

47.

See ELLIOT BULMER, FEDERALISM: INTERNATIONAL IDEA CONSTITUTIONBUILDING PRIMER 12, at 7 (2d ed. 2017).

48.

See Selassie, supra note 36, at 64 (discussing how the ethnic-federal system
of government in Ethiopia enables it to accommodate ethnic groups’
cultural, linguistic, and political decisions).
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ethnic groups, such as the Kurds in Iraq, in order to keep the regional
ethnic group within the State.49
B. Political Decentralization

Whereas federal governments share political power with regional
governments, unitary States decentralize singular national
administrative authority to local governments.50 Federal systems create
subnational (regional) governance structures such as governors,
regional parliaments, and regional courts that exercise exclusive or
concurrent powers with the central government. In contrast, unitary
State decentralization does not require the creation of subnational
regional governance structures to share power with the central
government. Decentralization is an administrative delegation of central
authority to subordinate geographic or functional units.51
The objectives of federalism and decentralization may also differ.
As discussed above, federalism can ease tensions in highly divided
societies with ethnic groups centered in different regions by providing
a degree of ethno-regional autonomy.52 In a democratic system,
decentralization goes beyond the mere administration of central
authority in also fostering democratic stability by supporting individual
rights and collective self-government.53 One scholar argues that
democratic decentralization gives people better incentives, more
opportunity to exercise their rights, and less reason to oppress one
another.54 These are the precise interests that individuals in highly
divided ethno-regionally diverse societies have in a reconstructed
State—the ability to exercise their rights free of oppression.
In examining the different forms by which democratic
decentralization may occur, it is helpful to use Professor Roderick Hills’

49.

See Kelly, supra note 45, at 726 (explaining that the Kurds settled for a
federal structure of autonomy and regionalism).

50.

CTR. FOR CONST. TRANSITIONS, DECENTRALIZATION IN UNITARY STATES:
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR THE ARAB STATES REGION 11–12
(2014) [hereinafter DECENTRALIZATION IN UNITARY STATES].

51.

Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a
National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 910 (1994).

52.

See DECENTRALIZATION IN UNITARY STATES, supra note 50, at 12 (noting
that one goal of a federal system of governance is to ease tensions between
different groups in society).

53.

See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Is Federalism Good for Localism? The Localist
Case for Federal Regimes, 21 J.L. & POL. 187, 190–91 (2005) (critiquing
Edward Rubin and Malcom Feely for characterizing the value of
decentralization as primarily being administrative efficiency, and stating
that it serves fundamental purposes crucial to democracy).

54.

See id. at 191 (arguing that decentralization feeds into the goals of selfgovernment).
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rubric of federalist, unitary, and localist democracies.55 The attributes
of a federalist democracy were discussed above. A unitary democracy
exists where the central government may devolve power and
responsibilities to a subnational local entity but that entity or
subnational unit receives no protections in the national constitution or
law—its authority and existence are at the whim of the central
government.56 In a unitary democracy, the local subnational unit exists
merely as an instrumentation of the central government and carries out
national law in accordance with local conditions.57 In a localist
democracy, the local government is granted authority under the
national constitution, which protects it from interference by the
national government (or regional government, if one exists) in its areas
of competency.58
In ethno-regionally divided societies, a federalist or localist
democracy may be beneficial, as both approaches provide constitutional
guarantees that ethnic groups will have control over their affairs at the
regional and/or local level. In some circumstances, a decentralized
localist democracy might be preferred to a federalist democracy. For
example, national governments might fear that an ethnically-defined
regional government might seek to declare independence from the
highly-divided State—a recurring fear of the national governments of
Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey, regarding Iraq’s Kurdish Region.59
Devolving power to local authorities rather than to regional
governments is an alternative constitutional design option that
supports local autonomy, without empowering a regional government
that might compete with the State. In divided multiethnic States, such
as Kosovo, the creation of decentralized local governments helped to
55.

See id. at 195–99 (distinguishing decentralized regimes into “federalist,”
“unitary,” or “localist” based on the central government’s power to regulate
and interfere with local governments).

56.

See id. at 198–99.

57.

See id. at 198 (discussing how subnational governments in a unitary
democracy do not receive legal protection, and thus function to carry out
national law).

58.

Id. at 199.

59.

See Kelly, supra note 45, at 726 (noting Syria, Iran, and Turkey’s concern
that an independent Kurdistan may lead to secessionist movements among
their own Kurdish populations). This fear of ethnic secession is not
unfounded. As the International Court of Justice determined in its Advisory
Opinion regarding Kosovo’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence, such
declarations of independence by ethnically defined regions are not violations
of general international law and may represent a people’s appropriate
exercise of their right to self-determination. See also Elena Cirkovic, An
Analysis of the ICJ Advisory Opinion on Kosovo’s Unilateral Declaration
of Independence, 11 GERMAN L.J. 895, 900 (2010) (discussing the dialogue
surrounding the right to external self-determination and the recognition of
states that do break off within the broader arena of international law).
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prevent the partition of the state along ethnic lines by creating local
institutions in which Kosovo Serbs and Albanians cooperated.60 In such
environments, local decentralization may foster national unity and
stability to a greater degree than regional federalism.61 However, the
quality and nature of the political decentralization in a specific State
will determine whether it fosters greater democratic accountability and
local citizen engagement.

V. Peace Processes and Accountability for
Atrocity Crimes
Legal scholars have examined how issues of legal accountability for
grave human rights violations are addressed during peace
negotiations.62 These scholars have offered theoretical frameworks for
understanding this dynamic. For example, peace scholars have long
debated the question of peace versus justice.63 The debate centers
around the issue of whether parties to a peace process, some of whom
may have been engaged in the commission of international crimes,
would agree to negotiate peace if there is the potential that they
themselves would subsequently be subjected to justice through criminal
accountability.64
Historically, amnesty played a central role in many twentieth
century peace agreements and was often seen as a necessary trade-off
for peace. For example, Turkish forces, who many considered
responsible for the massacre of eight hundred thousand to one million
Armenians65 during World War I, were given amnesty in the 1923
Treaty of Lausanne.66 In another instance of impunity, French and
Algerians soldiers who massacred thousands of civilians during the

60.

See Cirkovic, supra note 59, at 896, 908–09.

61.

See DECENTRALIZATION IN UNITARY STATES, supra note 50, at 30–34
(explaining that decentralization preserves national stability by broadening
citizenship participation and fragmenting central power).

62.

For an examination of this issue in the context of the Sudan peace process,
see generally Darin Johnson, Revolution, Peace and Justice in Sudan, 43
U. PA. J. INT’L L. 187 (2021).

63.

See generally Richard J. Goldstone, Peace Versus Justice, 6 NEV. L.J. 421
(2005–2006).

64.

Id. at 422–23.

65.

See Geoffrey Robertson, Was There an Armenian Genocide?, 4 U. ST.
THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 83, 100 (2010) (describing the number of
Armenians massacred).

66.

Treaty of Peace with Turkey [Treaty of Lausanne], ch. VIII, July 24,
1923, in 2 THE TREATIES OF PEACE 1919–1923 (1924).
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Algerian War were given amnesty under the Évian Agreement of 1962.67
During the 1980s, in Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Uruguay, former regime officials who had engaged in widespread
atrocity crimes against thousands of their citizens, including torture
and killing by death squads, were given amnesty as part of the political
transition to new governments.68
These blanket amnesties contributed to an initial peace, but in
many instances it was not a durable peace. Often amnesty resulted in
perpetrators returning to positions of power and recommitting
atrocities, or the amnesties fed lingering societal resentments that led
to a lack of social cohesion and recurrence of the conflict. For example,
a century after the Armenian genocide, many in the Armenian
community are still seeking a form of acknowledgement or reparations
related to the massacre by Turkish forces during WWI.69 Regarding
recurrence, many of the Algerian combatants receiving amnesty during
the Algerian War were involved in committing similar atrocities in the
Algerian Civil War.70
A move away from blanket amnesty in exchange for peace began
to occur in the late twentieth century, as hybrid international criminal
tribunals in Rwanda and Yugoslavia were established,71 and the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court was completed.72 These new
institutions reflected a growing consensus within the international legal
community that accountability following conflict is an integral part of
long-term peace in post conflict environments.73 The peace versus
justice dilemma evolved into a general consensus that transitional
justice arrangements should provide for both peace and justice.74
Despite this general consensus, peace versus justice tradeoffs continue
to abound. Different frameworks that transitional justice scholars and
practitioners have developed to explore the ongoing peace versus justice

67.

Paul R. Williams, Lawyering Peace: Infusing Accountability into the
Peace Negotiations Process, 52 CASE W. RSRV. J. INT’L L. 491, 494 (2020).

68.

Id.

69.

Id.

70.

Id.

71.

Id. at 499–502 (discussing the creation of the Rwanda and Yugoslavia
Tribunals and the ICC).

72.

Juan Menendez, Keynote Address at the McCulloch Center for Global
Initiatives, Justice and Imagination: Building Peace in Post-Conflict
Societies Conference, Justice or Peace? Can We Have Both? 4 (Mar. 1,
2014), https://www.mtholyoke.edu/sites/default/files/global/docs/Keynot
e.pdf [https://perma.cc/QS87-WVBD] (discussing the emergence and
importance of the Peace with Justice framework).

73.

Williams, supra note 67, at 498–99.

74.

Id.
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debate include “Peace First,” “Justice First,” and “Peace with Justice.”
This section explores each in turn.
A. Peace First Approach

The first theoretical framework in the Peace versus Justice dilemma
is referred to as the Peace First approach. The Peace First approach
prioritizes peace over accountability, and is singularly focused on
achieving an end to a conflict through a negotiated peace to save lives
as quickly as possible.75 Under this view, scholars have noted:
The singular role of [peace] negotiators is to seek an agreement
that brings the most immediate end to the violence. All other
goals and concerns that may impede immediate peace should be
pushed aside. In this way, the approach is single-minded and
pragmatic: peace is the priority and any obstacle to peace should
be avoided or eliminated.76

Advocates of the Peace First approach generally assert that
accountability should not be pursued immediately if doing so would
prolong the immediate conflict.77 Within a peace process, negotiating
parties who have committed atrocities are often seen as advocates for
a Peace First approach, as they hope to avoid accountability for their
crimes.78 Advocates of a Peace First approach would say that its
benefits include saving lives as quickly as possible and ending the
destructive harm that violence brings.79
An example of a Peace First approach is the Arab Spring conflict
in Yemen that arose in 2011.80 The Government security forces
responded to a Yemeni student uprising with violence that led 250
deaths, 1,000 injuries, and 100,000 displacements in ten months.81 The
Gulf Cooperation Council (“GCC”) stepped in and negotiated an end
to hostilities and a peace agreement that gave Yemeni President Saleh
immunity from prosecution for any crimes that he committed during
his thirty-five-year tenure, as long as he stepped down and transferred
75.

Paul R. Williams, Lisa K. Dicker & C. Danae Paterson, The Peace vs.
Justice Puzzle and the Syrian Crisis, 24 ILSA J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 417,
421 (2018).

76.

See id. at 420–21 (describing the theories underpinning the Peace First
approach and how one the most salient priorities under this approach is
ending the violence).

77.

Id. at 424–25.

78.

Id.

79.

Id. at 421.

80.

See Johnson, supra note 13, at 321–22 (discussing how Yemen President
Saleh was provided amnesty for some human rights violations to leave office
with the goal of quelling the Arab Spring conflict).

81.

Id. at 321.
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power to his Vice President.82 The GCC-mediated resolution involving
Saleh reflects the overall benefits and drawbacks to a Peace First
approach—although Saleh’s departure and amnesty agreement may
have ended the early phase of the conflict in Yemen, the agreement
ultimately allowed Saleh to retain his freedom and political influence.83
He later returned to Yemen to work with the armed Houthi secessionist
movement that devolved the country into a protracted civil war.84
B. Justice First Approach

The second theoretical framework is known as a Justice First
approach. In a peace process, a Justice First approach prioritizes justice
through accountability measures such as prosecution.85 A Justice First
approach might tolerate a prolonged peace process so long as
prosecution for atrocity crimes is part of any negotiated settlement.86
Parties to a conflict whose members have been the primary victims of
atrocity crimes and individual victims of atrocity crimes are often seen
as proponents of a Justice First approach.87 External entities such as
States that have ratified the ICC Statute and international institutions,
such as the ICC, are seen as advocates of a Justice First approach.88
The mechanisms that are used in a Justice First approach are the
ICC, ad hoc international criminal tribunals, hybrid tribunals,
specialized domestic courts, universal jurisdiction, and the prohibition
of any form of amnesty that violates international law.89 For example,
the ICC has prioritized justice by initiating investigations of its own
volition or at the request of States while parties are amid negotiating
peace.90 In the Sudan context, some peacemakers, including former U.S.
Envoy to Sudan Andrew Natsios, argued that the ICC’s 2008 issuance
of an arrest warrant for Omar al-Bashir’s international crimes in Darfur
would undermine the peace process with Darfur and the regime’s

82.

Id. at 321–22.

83.

See id.

84.

Shuaib Almosawa & Ben Hubbard, Yemen’s Ex-President Killed as
Mayhem Convulses Capital, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.ny
times.com/2017/12/04/world/middleeast/saleh-yemen-houthis.html
[https://perma.cc/8BKR-NGGK].

85.

Williams, Dicker & Paterson, supra note 75, at 430.

86.

Id. at 430–31.

87.

Id. at 431.

88.

Id.

89.

Id. at 434.

90.

Id. at 442.
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implementation of the 2005 North-South peace accord.91 However,
following Bashir’s toppling by the 2019 revolution, observers have
argued that Bashir’s prosecution by the ICC will further the cause of
peace92 and the Sudanese transition government has publicly stated
that it will turn Bashir over to the ICC.93
C. Peace with Justice Framework

Peace with Justice is an emerging framework that argues that peace
and justice are mutually enforcing rather than mutually exclusive and
that both objectives can and should be pursued concurrently.94 Peace
with Justice advocates observe that by combining peace with justice
during a peace process, the form of justice pursued naturally shifts from
retributive to restorative, because participants in a post-conflict peace
process may see restorative justice as an effective tool for
reconciliation.95 Restorative justice principles focus on reconciling the
wrongdoer with the victim through participatory processes that
acknowledge wrong-doing and seek reparation and healing.96 These
principles have informed transitional justice mechanisms such as truth
and reconciliation processes.97 Additional non-prosecutorial restorative
justice measures in transitional contexts include localized traditional
justice measures, memorialization, reparations, and institutional
reform.98 The long-term peace envisioned by Peace with Justice relies
upon the strategic sequencing and phasing of various transitional justice
mechanisms that embody restorative justice values.99 Strategic
sequencing anticipates that parties will seek justice following the
completion of a peace agreement, so justice and peace are not prioritized
91.

Opheera McDoom, ANALYSIS—Justice Clashes with Peace on Darfur
Bashir Warrant, REUTERS (July 14, 2008, 7:09 AM), https://www.reuters.
com/article/idUSMCD424646 [https://perma.cc/LS2K-UQBD].

92.

See e.g., Ali Anzola, Al-Bashir’s Trial at the ICC Will Be a Victory for the
Popular Revolution, MIDDLE E. MONITOR (Feb. 20, 2020, 5:00 PM),
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200220-al-bashirs-trial-at-the-iccwill-be-a-victory-for-the-popular-revolution/ [https://perma.cc/CUA6FL6E].

93.

Sudan Says Will ‘Hand Over’ Al-Bashir to ICC for War Crimes Trial,
AL JAZEERA (Aug. 12, 2021), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/12/s
udan-omar-al-bashir-icc-war-crimes-darfur [https://perma.cc/5Y8Z-EWUK].

94.

See generally Menendez, supra note 72 (discussing the emergence and
importance of the Peace with Justice framework).

95.

Williams, Dicker & Paterson, supra note 75, at 444.

96.

Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Restorative Justice: What Is It and Does It Work?,
3 ANN. REV. L & SOC. SCI. 10.1, 10.4 (2007).

97.

Id.

98.

See id. at 10.3

99.

Williams, Dicker & Paterson, supra note 75, at 445.
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over one another in separate processes, but rather carefully planned
together as part of a long-term process.100
D. Goal: Durable Peace with Justice

Within the peace and justice dialogue, there is a general consensus
today that both peace and justice are required for long-term stability
arising out of conflict, and minimizing either aim threatens that
stability. Justice and accountability mechanisms cannot achieve their
objectives of deterrence and non-recurrence if peace is not established.
Weak peace without justice is likely to result in a recurrence of the
conflict. Peace negotiators need to “carve out space for accountability
and justice in order to achieve a durable peace.”101
The importance of justice for durable peace can be seen in the
present-day response to the Latin American transitions of power during
the twentieth century that emphasized peace without justice through
blanket amnesty for government perpetrators.102 Over the last two
decades, victims challenged these amnesty laws in domestic and
regional courts.103 Domestic pressure and persistent calls for
accountability culminated in 2005, when the Argentine Supreme Court
of Justice formally declared blanket amnesties unconstitutional and
void.104 Following in the footsteps of Argentina, and in compliance with
international law, Uruguay, Peru, and El Salvador have all formally or
informally annulled their amnesty laws and are now bringing former
regime perpetrators of human rights atrocities to justice.105 After several
decades, the survivors of these atrocity regimes continue to demand
justice as a core element of long-term peace.

VI. PILPG Scholarship and the Praxis for Peace:
Looking to the Future
Legal scholars affiliated with PILPG have significantly contributed
to the legal theories undergirding the Praxis for Peace, drawing from
their work with PILPG and the broader transitional justice field. This
section highlights some of the more recent scholarship that contributes
to the Praxis for Peace produced by PILPG scholars.
100. Id.
101. Williams, supra note 67, at 511.
102. Santiago A. Canton, Amnesty Laws, in VICTIMS UNSILENCED: THE INTERAMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN LATIN
AMERICA 167, 167–68 (Catherine A. Sunshine ed., Gretta K. Siebentritt
trans., 2007).
103. See generally id.
104. Id. at 181.
105. See generally id.
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The scholarship of PILPG scholars has been particularly helpful in
contributing to the Praxis for Peace as the contributions have focused
on complex issues of public international law that arise in the
transitional justice space. PILPG scholars have sought to distill lessons
from these environments that may be useful to scholars and
practitioners working in these spaces. Three recent books by PILPG
scholars reflect this goal. PILPG founder and American University
Professor of Law and International Relations Paul Williams has
recently published a book that draws from thirty years of lessons
learned during peace negotiations with PILPG to help practitioners
understand and address the key issues that arise in the unique context
of negotiating a peace process.106
Paul Williams and PILPG Cofounder and Case Western Law CoDean Michael Scharf partnered with PILPG Managing Director and
Cleveland State University Law Professor Milena Sterio to author an
important book that examines the ways in which the Syrian conflict
has impacted the development of international law.107 The book benefits
from the unique insights that the authors were able to add from
PILPG’s work assisting with the Syrian peace process. Paul Williams
and Milena Sterio also coedited a third recent book, called the Research
Handbook on Post-Conflict State-Building. This book is essentially a
Praxis for Peace guide for scholars and practitioners in State-building
after conflict and includes chapters from PILPG scholars and
practitioners, including myself, on a broad range of topics including
post-conflict
constitution-making,
electoral
reform,
security
infrastructure, civil society, the rule of law and human rights.108
PILPG scholars have written extensively in the areas of atrocity
prevention and international criminal law. Some of the more recent
contributions of PILPG scholars to the Praxis for Peace in
international criminal law are discussed herein. Jane Stromseth, a
Georgetown University Professor of international law, a PILPG Senior
Peace Fellow, and the former Deputy Ambassador of Global Criminal
Justice at the U.S. State Department, has contributed to the Praxis for
Peace with scholarship that has focused on the challenges of
strengthening the rule of law in the aftermath of armed conflict.109 In a
recent piece, she emphasizes the importance of a synergistic approach
to rule of law building that is ends-based and strategic; adaptive and
106. PAUL WILLIAMS, LAWYERING PEACE 2 (2021).
107. PAUL WILLIAMS ET AL., THE SYRIAN CONFLICT’S IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2020).
108. See generally RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON POST-CONFLICT STATE BUILDING
(Paul Williams & Milena Sterio eds., 2020).
109. See, e.g., Jane Stromseth, Post-Conflict Rule of Law Building: The Need
for a Multi-Layered, Synergistic Approach, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1443,
1446–47 (2008).
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dynamic; where external actors have better cultural understanding of
the contexts in which they operate and where women and other
progressive local actors are empowered to advance human dignity and
human rights within their own societies.110 Drawing upon her experience
serving as Deputy to the Ambassador-at-Large in the State
Department’s Office of Global Criminal Justice, she has also written a
recent piece that examines the importance of U.S. engagement and
support for global criminal justice in addressing and preventing atrocity
crimes and highlights the ways in which thoughtful U.S. support to
international, hybrid and domestic justice mechanisms is consistent
with U.S. values and interests.111
Margaret deGuzman, James E. Beasley Professor of Law at Temple
University, a PILPG Senior Peace Fellow, and a recent appointee to
serve as a Judge on the U.N. International Residual Mechanism for
Criminal Tribunals, has written extensively in the area of international
criminal law. Her recent book explores the central role that the concept
of gravity has played in the development of international law and
proposes strategies for regimes and practitioners aimed at increasing
the legitimacy of international criminal law.112 Her recent scholarship
has also encouraged international criminal law practitioners to focus on
the goals of the communities that they serve, so that any tension
between local and global goals does not become an impediment to the
legitimacy and effectiveness of international criminal law.113 Her recent
scholarship has also examined sentencing in the International Criminal
Tribunal for Yugoslavia and made recommendations for international
criminal sentencing in line with community goals and values.114

110. Id. at 1452, 1456–57, 1459.
111. Jane Stromseth, The United States and the International Criminal Court:
Why Undermining the ICC Undercuts U.S. Interests, 47 GA. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 639, 643 (2019).
112. MARGARET M. DEGUZMAN, SHOCKING THE CONSCIENCE OF HUMANITY:
GRAVITY AND THE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 2 (2020).
113. Margaret deGuzman, Mission Uncertain: What Communities Does the ICC
Serve?, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT 387, 389 (Margaret M. deGuzman & Valerie Oosterveld eds., 2020);
Margaret deGuzman, Mixed Messages: The Sentencing Legacy of the Ad
Hoc Tribunals, in THE LEGACY OF AD HOC TRIBUNALS IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW: ASSESSING THE ICTY’S AND ICTR’S MOST SIGNIFICANT
LEGAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS 269, 270–71 (Milena Sterio & Michael P. Scharf
eds., 2019); Margaret deGuzman, The Global-Local Dilemma and the ICC’s
Legitimacy, in LEGITIMACY AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS 62, 78 (Harlan
Grant Cohen et al. eds., 2017).
114. Margaret deGuzman, Punishing for Humanity: The Sentencing Legacy of
the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, in LEGACIES
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA:
A MULTIDISCIPLINARY ACCOUNT 391, 391 (Carsten Stahn et al. eds., 2020).
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Brianne McGonigle Leyh, Utrecht University Professor of Law and
PILPG Senior Legal Adviser and Dr. Julie Fraser, Utrecht University
Professor of Law, and PILPG Senior Peace Fellow, have drawn from
their practice with PILPG in transitional justice to inform their
scholarship. They have co-authored several recent scholarly pieces,
including a book on the intersections of law and culture in the
International Criminal Court.115 In a chapter within their book, Fraser
examines the relevance of Islamic law for International Criminal Court
jurisprudence in cases from Afghanistan, Mali, Sudan, Libya, and other
Islamic majority States and observes that the ICC has missed an
opportunity to engage with relevant and compatible Islamic norms in
order to make justice and accountability more impactful for affected
communities.116 McGonigle Leyh and Fraser also recently coauthored
an article on reparations for victims of atrocities that examines the
theoretical approaches to repairing victims’ harm and identifies many
of the shortcomings that exist in practice that must be addressed.117
Dr. Kushtrim Istrefi, Utrecht University Professor of Law and
PILPG Senior Peace Fellow, has also written extensively in the areas
of international crimes and human rights accountability.118 Drawing
from his experience serving as counsel in the case of Mothers of
Srebrenica v. Netherlands before the European Court of Human Rights,
one his recent scholarly articles explores the obligations that State
authorities have to protect civilians when faced with situations that
require the prevention of genocide (Srebrenica) or hostage taking.119
Dr. Istrefi has also written in the area of constitution-making and
constitutional reform. One of his recent scholarly pieces explores the
emerging practice of domestication of human rights instruments in
post-conflict constitution-making, and the inspirational role that such

115. INTERSECTIONS OF LAW AND CULTURE AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT (Julie Fraser & Brianne McGonigle Leyh eds., 2020).
116. Julie Fraser, Exploring Legal Compatibilities and Pursuing Cultural
Legitimacy: Islamic Law and the ICC, in INTERSECTIONS OF LAW AND
CULTURE AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Julie Fraser & Brianne
McGonigle Leyh eds., 2020).
117. See generally Brianne McGonigle Leyh and Julie Fraser, Transformative
Reparations: Changing the Game or More of the Same?, CAMBRIDGE
INT’L L.J. 39 (2019).
118. See generally Kushtrim Istrefi, Kosovo’s Quest for Council of Europe
Membership, 43 REV. CENT. & E. EUR. L. 255 (2018); Kushtrim Istrefi &
Emma Irving, Rights in the Populist Era, A Comment on Bayev v. Russia
(ECtHR): More Didactic than Persuasive, 31 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 159 (2018).
119. See generally Kushtrim Istrefi, The Right to Life in the Mothers of
Srebrenica Case: Reversing the Positive Obligation to Protect from the Duty
of Means to that of a Result, 36 UTRECHT J. INT’L & EUR. L. 141 (2021).
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external human rights sources play in post-conflict societies.120
Similarly, my recent scholarship has made observations about
constitution-making in the wake of the Arab Spring. Using the
constitution-making processes in several Arab Spring countries
including Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen as case studies, my recent
scholarship assesses the extent to which participatory constitutionmaking has been implemented in each of these case studies and has
examined the impact of civil war and conflict on constitution-making
processes.121
These recent scholarly pieces offer just a small example of the
significant ways in which scholars affiliated with PILPG have
significantly contributed to the Praxis for Peace. The breadth of these
recent contributions is indicative of the impact that the PILPG
scholarly community has had in its areas of expertise: constitutional
reform, peace processes, and international criminal justice. During its
first twenty-five years, the PILPG scholarly community has produced
over two hundred fifty scholarly pieces that have expanded the Praxis
for Peace.122 The PILPG scholarly community will undoubtedly
continue to expand the Praxis for Peace in significant ways for years
to come.

120. Kushtrim Istrefi & Visar Morina, Judicial Application of International Law
in Kosovo, in JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN SOUTHEAST
EUROPE 165, 165 (Sinisa Rodin & Tamara Perišin eds., 2015).
121. See generally Darin E.W. Johnson, Beyond Constituent Assemblies and
Referenda: Assessing the Legitimacy of the Arab Spring Constitutions in
Egypt and Tunisia, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. (2015); Johnson, supra note
13, at 321–22.
122. Bibliography of PILPG Scholarly Community Contributions (on file with
author).
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